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CHAPTER V

THE RIGHT TO THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE, SECURITY, AND SELF-DEFENSE
IN OUTER SPACE
Attention has been called in preceding chapters to the emergence
of principles and rules of international law permitting the free use
of outer space for peaceful, i.e., nonaggressive and beneficial, purposes. Such purposes have been described as reasonable. It has been
stated that when the uses and exploration of outer space and celestial
bodies conform to such peaceful and reasonable activities that such
conduct is lawful.
Attention has also been called to the efforts of states, principally
through their deliberations in the United Nations, to determine with
some degree of specificity the kinds of limitations to be imposed upon
space conduct. It is apparent that wholly unrestricted conduct in
outer space would contribute neither to a structured legal order in
space nor would it be beneficial to the needs of man. This is true no
matter whether man is situated on the surface of the earth, in the
airspace, or in outer space.
With the massive application of modern science and technology to
the secrets of outer space, it has become clearly apparent that this
newly exploitable environment may be used in all of the traditional
and conventional ways pertaining to airspace and to the earth's surface. "\Vith this understanding has come the need to consider the
legal rights of a state to the maintenance of peace, security, and selfdefense in outer space.
The new tempo of man's existence has consolidated and capsulized
both time and space. From this point of view there is a need for man
to have an early and constant a\vareness of acceptable standards of
space conduct and the content of space law. From the legal point of
view it must be kept in mind, pursuant to General Assembly Resolutions 1(21 A (XVI), 1802 (XVII), and 1962 (XVIII) ,t and the
consensus of states as reflected by their constant behavior, that international law and the Charter of the United Nations apply to space
activities.
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1

320
Just as certain standards of conduct have developed for the peaceful exploitation of the scientific resources of outer space, so also there
are both old and rapidly emerging standards applicable to the security needs of states in space. Thus, w·ith the swiftly evolving capabilities of resource states to make use of the space dimension, there has
also come the recognition that it is a sharable resource. Accordingly,
its use is not limited or restricted to a single state.
orld claims to
the exploitation of outer space have resulted from the actual uses of
the dimension. Such claims have been honored through common
usages and practices.
The concept of claims has been deYeloped by McDougal and Lipson, who have stated that, like other claims in internationalla,v, the
claims to the use of outer space "carry a promise of reciprocity, combined 'vherever possible with latent or expressed threats of retaliation
or reprisal if the complementary promise is dishonored. This pattern
of reciprocally tolerated access to outer space for sharable or inclusive uses may be restricted by the attempt to ensure the public order
of the world community through devices providing security from
military attack, preventing or at least making difficult the activities
of unaccountable (flag less) space objects or spacecraft (to be compared with measures against piracy on the high seas) and iinposing
rules of the road." 2
The require1nents of national defense in the space age have taken
on new proportions in view of the actual and potential applications
of modern science and technology to outer space. l\{an 's concern will
be directed to protection from harm in outer space no less than to
protection on earth fron1 activities which have their source in space.
His aspirations for security are deeply indigenous to his entire
political-legal environment.
Presently existing international legal obligations deny to states
the legal right to threaten or engage in aggression in order to resolve international disputes. ''Thile it is inevitable that serious differences may exist among states as the result of competing national
interests, yet it is possible for such difficulties to be resolved in the
political-legal forum. This forum, represented in an institutionalized
form by the United Nations and regional organizations, unhappily
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2 :McDougal and Lipson, "Perspectives for a Law of Outer Space," 52 A.J.I.L.
415-416 (1958); Legal Problems of Space Exploration, A Sytnposium, 417. They
have noted that states in the attainment of a modicum of security will be concerned with "the indefinite postponement of unacceptably destructive violence,
the achievement of some stability of expectation as to modes of exercising
effective power, (and] the maintenance of public order against hostile or reckless or capricious threats." Ibid., 418.
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is not a perfect one for the resolution of serious international conflict.
Were it more perfect than it is, it might be possible for a monopoly
of international sanctions to be exercised by an international institution. Every effort, it may be suggested, must always be made to
resolve outer space difficulties through collective international processes. However, when such institutions-because of their primitive
quality, or for other reasons-are not able to use effectively the
powers possessed, or are lacking in powers, then it becomes readily
apparent that states may be obliged in grave matters to engage in
self-help. In international law this is known as the inherent right of
self-defense. It may be collective or individual. Its use is circumscribed by political and legal considerations. These considerations
have direct applicability to national and international rights and
duties in space. It has been observed that "The dangers to peace
which exist and which may exist in the future stem from the threat
or use of force in violation of international legal obligations. The
standards 'vhich must be used in determining and controlling exertions of national po,ver have not been altered by the ne\v \Vorld which
outer space activities has opened." 3 Under these circumstances, international respect for i1nportant common interests, based upon an
awareness of the mutuality of certain interests among resource states,
may serve as a foundation for an ordered legal structure for outer
space.
A. I.JEGAL AUTHORITY FOR DEALING WITH CERTAIN USES

In the international arena, as in the municipal forum, many controversies may be resolved without recourse to force or coercion.
The interests of the world community are very frequently best protected through the use of negotiation in seeking the resolution of
disputes. 4 Negotiation carries with it a vast range of opportunities
for peaceful settlements, and diplomacy may be able to utilize the
breadth of its capabilities in arriving at mutually acceptable resolutions of given problems.
Law's scope for dealing with problem situations, although not so
broad as that of negotiation, has, nonetheless, a 'vide spectrum of
principles, standards, and rules through which international disputes
may be resolved and ameliorated. The versatility of the law for
successful compromise in the face of seemingly unresolvable difficulties has been well summed up by Jackson who has properly made
3 Meeker, "Observation in Space," Department of State Press Release No.
191 (Revised), April 12, 1963, 7; 48 Departnwnt of State Bulletin 750 (1963).
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U.N. Charter, Chapter VI, especially Article 33.
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the point that law possesses a certain "statecraft." 5 It is as much
the function of internationalla'v to establish the principle that space
may be used freely for peaceful purposes as it is its function to
establish the legal duty of states to abstain from certain uses of outer
space. International law, including the U.N. Charter, assures to
states the right to enjoy the benefits of international peace and security and provides them 'vith a legal right to maintain international
peace and security. A state is also entitled, under international law,
to maintain its continued existence and is permitted pursuant to the
rule of law to engage in measures of self-defense, either collective or
individual, to uphold this right.
Prior to the present century, international law devoted n1uch of its
attention to the regulation of the manner in which war between nations might be conducted. During the twentieth century, however,
an effort has been made to transfer to the United Nations a 1nonopoly
on the use of international force. The 1nanner in which states 1nay
protect their essential rights is now very much affected by the terms
of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with the maintenance
of international peace, security and self-defense. It should be noted,
ho,,ever, that the fundamental rights and duties of states are affected
by the totality of international law no matter what form it 1nay
take. In addition to the Charter this includes, among other sources,
general custo1nary international law. From the latter is derived
initially the inherent right of a state to protect itself against the
aggressive or potentially aggressive conduct of another. 6
l. The Legal Duty to Abstain from Certain Uses
Through the deliberations at the United Nations, and by other
means, it has been clen1onstrated that a virtually unanimous consensus exists that outer space and celestial bodies should be used
solely for peaceful purposes. The existing resource states have given
their approval to this principle. 7 The United States has from the
very first insisted that space must be used for nonaggressive and
beneficial purposes. \Vhile the Soviet 1Jnion has not expressly and
formally accepted this for1nula in an international treaty, it should
be noted that it has not expressly-nor ilnplicitly-rejected this view.
Both states have clearly indicated that the use of outer space must
be controlled, and this has demonstrated that both are of the view
that certain_, including some specifically delineated, activities are not
s Jackson, Jurisprudence in Action, Fore,vord, iv, (1953).
Infra, pp. 322-332.
1 U.N. Doc. A/5656; A/RES/1962 (XVIII), .Annex 4, infra, pp. 450-452.
Compare, U.N. Doc. A/5571; A/RES/1884 (XVIII), Annex 13, infra, pp. 462-463.
6
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permissible. As a result of their discussions and exchanges of points
of view, it has been possible for certain common interests to be
identified.
At the time of this writing neither state has placed w·eapons of
mass destruction into outer space. Each has expressed the view that
this ·should not be done and both have agreed to, and supported,
General Assembly Resolution 1884 (XVIII) .8 Each has cautioned
that if one should do so, the other would be obliged to act similarly.
Thus, the condition at the present may be described as one of mutual
restraint based on law.
The existence of an express agreement in this area is important in
vie'v of the traditional principle of international law that when national conduct is not prohibited, it may be argued that it is permitted.9 Nonetheless, if resource states continue to refrain from this
particular use of space for an undesignated period of time-probably
a short period by reason of the speed 'vith which customary international law· affecting outer space has developed-it might, as a result
of such conduct, readily be assu1ned that the stationing of such space.
objects in outer space or on celestial bodies had become unlawful.
In vie'v of the fearful dangers 'vhich the presence of such devices
might potentionally bring to all mankind, or may be assumed to
bring, it is hard to conceive that there could be a consensus supporting their legality, or that their mere presence could be regarded as
a peaceful use.
2. The Right to the Maintenance of International Peace and
Security

To properly discuss this topic, it becomes necessary to make some
assu1nptions. First, assume that a weapon of 1nass destruction has
been unilaterally introduced into outer space or placed on a celestial
body. Second, we must assume also that this action is violative of
man's general expectations of a legal order in the universe because
of the extreme threat of disastrous force represented by the presence
of such an object. Under these circumstances there would arise a
need to determine the legal bases for dealing with such a vehicle.
Since the probable effect of the exploitation of such force 'vould not
substantially exceed the effect realizable through its presence and
threatened use, there 'vould appear to be no need to distinguish between the threat of use and actual use. In short, mere presence presumably would constitute so grave a danger that it could be legally
assimilated to actual aggressive use.
8
9

Op. cit.
Supra, pp. 142, 266-267.
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Aggression 1nay be proven by detnonstrating an intentional and
"~holly unprovoked arn1ed attack. This is the clearest and most
classic exa1nple. However, it is equally clear that aggression may
take 1nany for1ns. Thus, for example, the Inter-..A_merican Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance of 1947, frequently referred to as the Rio
Treaty or Pact, made provision in Article Six for a condition in
which an aggression "is not an ar1ned attack * * *" 10
Further, aggression appears to be but one of several ways in ''hich
great harm 1nay be brought to a state and its people. It is frequently
cited as a leading exa1nple because of the gravity of the consequences
attendant upon its employ1nent. However, the key problem is not
so much the matter of aggression, but rather the application of an
unacceptably large amount of harm-either immediate or potential
(and if potential without a real opportunity for the potentially
harmed state to redress the situation in a manner favorable to itself)
by one state to another. Thus, the violation of the integrity of territory, or the prejudicial li1nitation of sovereign rights, or the restriction of the political independence of a state, or the intentional
Tiolent modification of an existing political-n1ilitary equilibrium by
positioning ''eapons of n1ass destruction in outer space would each
illustrate a national effort to apply an unacceptably large an1ount
of harn1 by one state to another. This is taken into account by the
Charter of the United K ations when it was n1ade applicable to outer
space and celestial bodies through General . .A_sseinbly Resolutions
1721 (X\7 I), 1802 (X\TII) and 1962 (XVIII). General Assembly
Resolution 1884 (X\TIII) also has a direct application to this situation .
. .t\..rticle
.
1 of the Charter, in 1naking provision for the purposes and
principles of the Organization, provides that an essential objective
is to maintain international peace and security. To this end, provision is n1acle for the collective "suppression of acts of aggression or
other breaches of the peace." The san1e article takes into account
the need for the adjustment or settle1nent of situations "''hich 1night
lead to a breach of the peace." The Charter imposes tlu~ duty on each
1nember to act in accordance 'vith the follo,,ing pro"Vision of Article
2(4):
All ~!embers shall refrain in their interna tiona} relations from
the threat of use of force against the territorial integrity or
1o 21 UNTS 93, et seq. (1948).
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political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United N ations. 11
In view of these provisions, albeit general in nature, it may be urged
that there is a duty on the part of states not to position weapons of
mass destruction in outer space or celestial bodies. Further, by reason
of the express terms of General Assembly Resolution 1884 (XVIII),
it is now clearly established that the presence of such weapons in
outer space may be considered to be a threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.
Under Article 1 (2) each nation has the duty "to strengthen uiversal peace." Article 2(3) requires of each member that it not endanger
''international peace and security" in the resolution of international
disputes. Article 2 ( 6) extends to nonmembers the duty to conform
to "the maintenance of international peace and security." These
articles, then, 'vhich set out the "Purposes and Principles" of the
Charter, as 'vell as other articles, make abundant reference to the
legal duty of states to conform to the principles of "international
peace and security." Additionally, as a regional require1nent, there
is the la " of the 1947 Rio Pact.
The legal principles of Article 2 ( 4) fall into t'vo parts. In the
first, there is imposed a duty on states to conforn1 to the principles of
international peace and security by refraining from conduct 'vhich
'vould unnecessarily and improperly aggravate interstate relations.
It 1nay be concluded that the placing of weapons of mass destruction
in orbit, or upon a celestial body, or nuclear testing in the atmosphere, outer space, or under water, would have such an effect, and
that such conduct is not legally permissible. In the second, assuming
the prior orbiting of 'veapons of mass destruction, or their emplacement upon a celestial body, or nuclear testing of the kinds inhibited
in the ~fosco'v Treaty, 1963, the principles of Article 2 ( 4) permit
action designed to correct such dangerous conditions. The action
taken to correct such threats to international peace and security is
neither in violation of Article 2 ( 4) nor inconsistent w·ith the purposes and principles of the Charter.
7

For the background of Article 2 ( 4), see Davis "First Commission: General Provisions,," in the United Nations Charter: Development and Text, 413
International Conciliation (September 194:3) ; 6 United Nations Conference on
[nternational Organization 80-82, 696-705; Russell and l\Iuther, A Ilistory of
the United Nations Charter, Chapters V-IX, XXIV, and pages 455-457, 473-47(),
655-657, 672-675, 1067 (1958). Compare l\IcDougal and Feliciano, "Legal Regulations of Resort to International Coercion: Aggression and Self-Defense in
Policy Perspective," 68 I"ale Law Journal 1146 (1959).
11
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Article 2( 4) is, therefore, the source of a legal duty requiring
states to desist from aggravated courses of action. It also is the
source of affirmative corrective action-authorizing, but not requiring, states (either in an individual or collective capacity) to engage
in protective measures intended to correct departures fron1 fundamental legal principles. This is not inconsistent 'vith Chapter VI of
the United Nations Charter and its provisions for the pacific settlenlent of disputes.
3. The National Right to Self-Defense
Just as the legal rights and duties 'vhich flow from the Charter
concepts of international peace and security apply on the surface of
the globe and to the superjacent airspace, so they apply also to outer
space. And, as the legal concepts of self-defense have applicability
on earth and in its airspace, they like,vise have applicability to outer
space.
The internationalla'v of self-defense is derived from t'vo principal
sources. These are general customary international law and the
Charter of the United Nations. Both sources are closely interrelated,
and in fact the customary right of self-defense must be taken into
account in interpreting the Charter provision, namely, Article 51.
Article ,51 provides in part:
Nothing in the present Charter shall in1pair the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken the Ineasures necessary to maintain international peace and security * * *.
Customary international la'v has long recognized that self-defense
is an inherent national right. It has been referred to as an "inalienable right" 12 w·hich has been "confinned in the United Nations Charter." 13 Although Article 51 of the Charter uses the term "armed
attack," it has not generally been thought that a state must actually
have felt the force of an adversary's 'veapons before it may engage
in legitimate self-defense. In looking at the customary principles of
12 Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, Department of Defense Press Re·
lease No. 112G-G2, (September 5, 1962).
13 Ibid.
Compare, Brownlie, "The Use of Force in Self-Defense," 37 Brit.
Yb. Int'l L. 219-247 (1961). A careful analysis has been made by Bowett,
Self-Defense in International Law (1958) ; see also :Mallison, "Limited Naval

Blockade or Quarantine-Interdiction; National and Collective Defense Claims
Valid under International Law," 31 George Washington Univer&ity Law Re·
view 367 (1962). Compare, Kunz, "Individual and Collective Self-Defense,"
41 A.J.I.L. 872 ( 1947).
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international la,v, it becomes clear that a state may engage legally
in self-defense in provocative circumstances, particularly where it
reasonably appears that the dangers being mounted against it may,
if placed in motion, materially or substantially impair its way of
life or prejudice its right to its o'vn continued existence.
A restrictive interpretation has been made of the national right of
self-defense by those writers who have placed a literal co~struction
on the term "armed attack" as contained in Article 51. This 'vould
require a state to remain passive until after a physical attack had
been launched, and has been based on the view that the best evidence
of an armed attack is the resultant force. This vie'v refuses to take
into account considerations of intention and manifestations of intent
as demonstrated by observable facts and conditions short of the ultimate resort to force.
In the space age, and particularly in the context of the possibility
of introducing an artificial satellite into orbit equipped with a
'"eapon of mass destruction,. it does not appear to be reasonable to
accept the literal interpretation of "armed attack" as the condition
precedent to employment of measures of self-defense. An excessively narro'v view of the meaning of "armed attack" is quite "out
of keeping with the dynamic quality of la '' and with the tempo of
our t'ventieth century social complex." 14
Scientific and technological considerations make it impossible to
accept the passive or "sitting duck" 15 vie'v of armed attack from
any of the earth's dimensions. Both general customary international
la 'v and the rule of Article 51 provide adequate foundations upon
'vhich to base action relating to the impermissible presence in space
of 'veapons of mass destruction. This has been stated in McDougal
and Lipson as follo,vs:
Certainly, in the absence of general agreement and community
institutions to restrict inclusive uses to peaceful purposes, states
will continue to assert, within the limits of their effective po"~er,
a unilateral competence to police or destroy space objects re14

Christo! and Davis, "Maritime Quarantine: The Naval Interdiction of
Offensive "\Veapons and Associated l\iateriel to Cuba, 1962," 57 A.J.l.L. 532
(1963). Compare :McDougal and Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public
Order 121-260 (1961) ; Dillard; Pugh; Friedman; Lissitzyn in Coluu~bia Law
School News (November 7, 1962).
15 Berle; Lissitzyn in Colutnbia Law School News (November 7, 1962). The
term "sitting-duck" is also used by l\IcDougal and Feliciano in "Legal Regulation to Resort to International Coercion: Aggression and Self-Defense in Policy
Perspective," supra note 11, at 260.
791-405-66-(22
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garded as i1npermissibly affecting the security of their land
1nasses. ''Tith respect to the oceans, assertion of such unilateral
competence has been made and accepted for 1nany purposes, including the protection of health, revenue, internal monopolies,
and so on. Conceivably, a similar developn1ent in demand and
reciprocal tolerance for a variety of purposes may occur '\vith
respect to outer space. 16
Cooper has considered the precise issue presented here, and has
asked "'Vhat are the rights of self -defense in outer space~" and
"Concretely, \vhen and \vhere 1nay a nation in self-defense attack
a suspected spacecraft~" 17 He has also asked "Is it permissible for
a state to intercept in outer space a foreign spacecraft known to be
armed "~ith a nuclear warhead and thereby constituting a source of
potential attack on any state flo,vn over~" 18 After a careful revie'v
of restrictive interpretations of Article 51 on the part of Kunz,19
ICelsen, 20 J essup/ 1 and ICrylov, and less literal interpretations of the
1neaning of "armed attack" by Goodhart, 22 and ~icDougal, 23 Professor Cooper has rejected the restrictive interpretations. In doing so
he stated that "neither Article 2 nor Article 51 nor the Charter as a
whole has, in my considered judgn1ent, li1nited or destroyed the fundamental right of a State to defend itself by force against i1n1ninent
attack or danger threatening its existence. * * * Certainly the Charter was not intended as an instrtnnent of reverse ·world feeling against
aggression." 24
Goodhart has stated the correct rule that "all powers w·hich have
not been expressly or by necessary in1plication transferred to the
United Nations ren1ain in the individual States. They hold these
po"~ers not by grant but by sovereign right." 25 Lord ICilmuir, Lord
Chancellor of Great Britain, told the British Parlia1nent on Noven1ber 1, 1D5G, \Yith regard to the 1neaning of 1\.rticle 51 that it "'vould
:\IcDougal and Lipson, supra note 2, at 427.
Cooper, "Self-Defense in Outer Space and the United Nations," 45 Air
Force and Space Digest 51-52 (February 19G2).
1 8 Ibid., 53.
1 9 Kunz, " Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter
of the United Xations." 41 A ..J.I.L. 871 (1947). It should be noted that in
some instances views on this s ubject expressed immediately after the drafting
of the Charter have been nwdified by an appreciation of the scientific and
technologieal changes in weaponry.
2 0 Kelsen, Th e Law of the United ")-lations 797-7!)!) (1951).
2 1 .Jessup, A Jfod ern Law of Sation.~ 1G~-1GG (1955).
22 Goodhart, "The North Atlantic Treaty," 79 Recueil des Cours 193 (1951).
2 3 :McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 11, at 1057.
2 4 Cooper, op. cit. , G5.
2.'5 Goodhart, op. cit., 55.
16
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be a travesty of the purpose of the Charter to compel a defending
State to allow its opponent to deliver the first fatal blow." 26 The
situation was \vell summarized by Green, a distinguished British
international lawyer, as follows: "The right of self-defense \vas inherent before the Charter was written; it has remained inherent and
as such it covers preventive self-defense as well as self-defense resorted to after you have already been exterminated." 27 Elihu Root
in addressing the American Society of International Law summed
up the basic proposition in 1914 when he stated that each sovereign
state has the right "to protect itself by preventing a condition of
a.ffairs in \vhich it will be too late to protect itself." 28
'The extent of national sovereignty is no measure of the area in
\vhich a state may employ legitimate measures of self-defense. Thus,
self-defensive acts may be employed on and above the high seas, and
they may also be used in outer space. The legal conditions under
which valid self-defense may be engaged in have been well known
and well respected for many years. The classic instance of self-defense, including limitations thereon, resulted from the destruction
in the United States by British forces of a vessel, The Caroline,
\vhich had been employed in 1837 on the Niagara River in support of
Canadian insurgents. It \Vas the British contention that the act of
(lestructioa was an instance of valid self-defense. Daniel \Vebster,
the A1nerican Secretary of State, asserted that it was incun1bent
upon the British and Canadian authorities to justify the attack,
and that in order to do so it would be necessary to sho\v "a necessity
of self-defense, instant, overwhehning, leaving no choice of means
and no moment of deliberation." 29 He also stated that where selfdefense under such circu1nstances was admitted as being lawful, it
'vas incu1nbent upon the actor to de1nonstrate that nothing unreasonable or excessive had been done, for, as he indicated "the act, justified
by the necessity of self-defense, must be limited by that necessity
and kept clearly within it." 30
If, under appropriate conditions, self-defense may be pursued
\vithin the territory of another state, it \Vould appear that there
could be no objection to recourse to self-defense, if the conditions are
appropriate, \Vhere the nonsovereign dimension of outer space is
used. There \vould appear to be an even greater right, and certainly
26

"House of Lords Debates," 6 Int'l & Contp. L. Q. 330 (1957).
International Law Association, Report of the 48th Conference 517 (1958).
28 Root, "The Real l\lonroe Doctrine," 8 A.J.I.L. 432 (1914).
29 The Caroline, 2 1\loore, Digest of International Law § 217 (1909). Conlpare Jennings, "The Caroline and l\1cLeod Cases," 32 A.J.l.L. 8 (1938).
ao The Caroline, ibid.
27
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no involvement with the doctrine of sovereignty, because of the provisions of General Assembly Resolutions 1721 (XVI), 1802 (XVII),
and 1962 (X\TIII). The latter_ states that neither outer space nor
celestial bodies might be made the subject of "national appropriation
by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any
other means." It 'vould not be an invasion of the sovereign rights
of a state to engage in legitimate self-defense in outer space.
However, it 'vould still be the duty of the state engaging in selfdefense to en1ploy only such measures as 'vere reasonably proportionate to the threat. This doctrine requires an offended state to use only
such proportional means as are necessary to induce the offending
state to withdra'v from its offending course of conduct, provided,
ho"~ever, that the offended state is not -required by international law
to delay its response in the face of any i·eal threat. For exan1ple,
in the 1962 1naritime quarantine of the shipment of offensive "Teapons
and associated materiel to Cuba, the interdictory activities were restricted to areas of the high seas radiating out from Cuba a li1nited
distance, and the interdictory activities 'vere limited to prescribed
offensive 'veapons and associated 1nateriel. This response 'vas considered by the United States to be proportionate to the condition
resulting fro1n the management and delivery to Cuba by Soviet personnel of offensive weapons constituting a threat to the United States
from Cuba. 31 Ho,vever, in those circumstances it 'vas abundantly
clear, if Soviet weapons and personnel had not been re1noved fro1n
Cuba as the result of the li1nited coercive pressures imposed upon
Soviet shipping, that additionally more severe coercive measures
would have resulted. The doctrine of proportionality possesses a
multioptioned spectrum of coercion. This 'vas described by Secretary of State Rusk during the 1962 Cuban crisis in these 'vords:
e
must tailor our response, individually and collectively, to the degree
and direction of the threat, be firm in our convictions and resolute
and united in our actions." 32
The doctrine of proportionality is not restricted to a condition of
self-defense. Proportionality applies "Tith equal logic to coercive
actions taken in response to the need to enforce a condition of international peace and security pursuant to the Charter of the United
Nations, the Rio Pact, or any other international agreement specify-

"''r

Christo! and Davis, supra note 14, at 525-545. Compare ~Ieeker "DefensiYe
Quarantine and The La\v," 57 A.J.I.L. 515 (1962).
32 Rusk, "American Republics Act to Halt SoYiet Threat to Hemisphere,"
47 Department of State Bulletin 721 (1962). On the concept of reasonableness,
see :McDougal, Lasswell and Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space 293, 304-6
(1963).
31
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ing a duty to conform to the needs of international peace and security. In this connection, it should be noted that the 1962 maritime
quarantine of the shipment of offensive weapons and associated materiel to Cuba was not based exclusively, or even essentially, on the
legal doctrine of self-defense, but rather was based principally on
the right of a collectivity of states, acting pursuant to a regional
agreement within the compass of the U.N. Charter, to uphold, in an
affirmative way, the principles of international peace and security.
The Legal Adviser to the Department of State has described the
1962 quarantine action as one "authorized under the Rio Treaty of
1947, whose primary purpose \Vas to organize law-abiding states for
collective action against threats to the peace." 33
4. Reprisals
Reprisals in international law constitute a form of self-help, and
are not unrelated to the doctrine of self-defense. In modern theory
they are regarded as a form of force used by a wronged state against
another because the first state has engaged in unlawful conduct adverse to the interests of the injured state. ''Tere it not for the wrongful conduct of the guilty state, the response through the act of
reprisal \vould be regarded as unla,vful. A distinguishing feature of
a repraisal has been that a national response need not conform to the
form of conduct practiced against it, but may "take any form of
coercion \Yhich the state believed to be effective to secure redress." 34
. Fen \vick has also noted that "In principle, reprisals of the more
drastic character \vere not to be distinguished from acts of war." 35
Ho,Yever, it it is true that "acts of force performed by one State
against another by way of reprisal * * * are not necessarily acts
initiating war." 36 The other state al,vays has an election as to
whether it considers such acts as constituting an act of \Var.
3 3 Chayes, "Law and the Quarantine of Cuba," 41 Foreign Affairs 555 (1963).
Compare Chayes, "The Legal Case for U.S. Action in Cuba," 47 Department of
State Bulletin 763 (1D62).
34 Fenwick, International Law 533 (3d ed. 1948). See The Naulilaa Incident,
8 Recueil des Decisions des Tribunnaux arbitraux mixtes 409, 422-425 (1928) ;
Briggs, The Law of Nati.ons 677-679 (1D38).
35 Fenwick, op. cit., 533.
36 II Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, International Law 203 (7th ed. 1952). Kunz
has noted that "reprisals can be conceived of as sanctions, because they
presuppose a delict, even if auto-determined by the state exercising the reprisals * * *" "Sanctions in International Law," 54 A.J.I.L. 325 (1960) ;
Article 41 of the U.N. Charter enumerates measures open to the Security
Council not involving the use of armed force. Article 42 makes reference to
measures by air, sea, or land forces. It is generally agreed that the use of
such measures should be preferably collective rather than unilateral, when the
maintenance of international peace and security is at issue.
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Under these circumstances the illegal introduction into outer space
by one country of an instrument of mass destruction contrary to
General Asse1nbly Resolution 1884 (XVIII) might be considered
by another state to entitle it to act similarly. But, as reprisals need
uot conform to the initiatory action, it would be possible-through
a reprisal action-for the har1ned state to effect the destruction of,
or to deal more sparingly with, the offending space vehicle and its
'veapon. At that point each state would have to decide 'vhether the
initial act and the response would result in a condition of 'var. The
gravity of the initial illegal conduct would grant to the harmed
state the right to use all suitable means to protect itself.
In this area, as in the areas of self-defense and the maintenance
of conditions of international peace and security, the international
law of outer space will play a role. States, in arriving at policy
decisions respecting the variable uses of outer space, must take into
account "the ways in 'vhich authority will and should be prescribed
and applied, will undoubtedly grow by the slow building of expectations, the continued accretion of or repeated instances of tolerated
acts, the gradual develop1nent of assurance that certain things may
be done under promise of reciprocity and that other things must not
be done on pain of retaliation." 37
B. COMPETENCE TO DEAL WITH CERTAIN USES

A state, such as the United States, which continually has given
evidence of its support of the rule of law in ''orld affairs, must always maintain a sound and sufficient legal basis for its activities in
outer space. In the face of potential national conflicts of interest as
to the uses of outer space and celestial bodies, the United States,
along with other states, possesses certain options relative to legal conduct.
The enforcement of legal rights n1ay be collective. On the other
hand, it may be individual. These methods of procedure must be
examined in the context of the principles of international peace and
security as W'ell as in the context of self-defense. Further, the concept of the maintenance of international peace and security as derived from the Charter of the United Nations must be examined in
the additional context of enforcen1ent by a regional agency or by
separate and distinct collective security organizations. "'\Vben emphasis
is p1 aced on a regional agency, such as the Organization of American
States, attention must be focused on Article 52 ( 1) of the Charter.
When emphasis is placed on a 'vider collective security process, then
37

McDougal and Lipson, supra note 2, at 420.

333
attention must be focused on Article 2( 4) of the Charter~ but at the
same time taking into account the Charter in its entirety. At the
same time due attention must be given to the general principles of
international law, including general customary international la\v.
This also holds true when enforcement procedures are contemplated
through mutual security arrangements.
In such situations the emerging international la \Y of outer space
has benefited very materially from the law of the sea. Both the high
seas and outer space and celestial bodies fall into the legal category
of res con~munis omnium. This means that each dimension is free for
the use of all, but that in no case does such freedon1 entail unlimited
or unrestricted conduct. As has been previously suggested, two inlportant modern limitations upon such freedom of use are that neither
dimension may be used exclusively by one state, and lawful uses are
restricted to nonaggressiYe, i.e., peaceful and beneficial activities.
The 1962 maritime quarantine of the shi p1nent of Soviet offensive
weapons and associated materiel to Cuba, as one aspect of the law
of the sea, affords valuable insights to the principles and rules of
the international law of outer space. The 1962 maritime quarantine
\vas a collective action, authorized under . .t\.rticle 52 (1) of the U.N.
Charter, and was ilnplemented under the terms of Article 6 of the
Rio Treaty. Article 52 ( 1) provides in part:
1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of
regional * * * agencies for dealing with such matters relating to
the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such * * * agencies and
their activities are consistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.
There is much legal analysis upholding the view that a collectivity
of states, as in the maritime quarantine, has the right to uphold
affirmatively international peace and security when such action is
taken pursuant to a regional agreement within the compass of the·
Charter of the United Nations. 38 This vie'v has received the express
approval of the United States Department of State. 39
As is well known, the maintenance of international peace and security by collective measures is a primary responsibility of the United
38

Christo! and Davis, supra note 14, at pp. 537-539; 1\IcDevitt, "The UN
Charter and the Cuban Quarantine," 17 The JAG Journal 72-75 (1963) ..
3 9 Chayes, supra note 33, at 555 and 763; 1\Ieeker, "Role of Law in Political
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Nations. Article 1 ( 1) of the Charter, in setting :forth the purposes
and principles of the United Nations, provides:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end:
to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal o:f threats to the peace, and for the suppression o:f acts o:f
aggression or other breaches o:f the peace, and to bring about by
peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles o:f justice
and international law, adjustment or settlement o:f international
disputes or situations which might lead to a breach o:f the peace.
Article 24, 'vhich makes provision :for the :functions and po,vers of
the Security Council, grants to that body the "primary responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security." This responsibility, although primary, is not exclusive, and as a result o:f the
"Uniting :for Peace Resolution" o:f November 3, 1950, the General
Assembly assu1ned the authority to engage in the maintenance o:f
international peace and security during the l(orean police action.
This resulted in the implementation in !Corea o:f collective security
measures against aggressors located in North !Corea and in Red
China, and was certainly a notable precedent in the use o:f collective
measures to protect the right o:f the world community to internatio~lal peace and security.
Collective defense measures 1nay also be instituted pursuant to
.i\.rticle 51 o:f the Charter o:f the United Nations. Such action is lawful when a state is obliged to engage in self-defense pending appropriate action on the part o:f the Security Council (or General Assembly pursuant to the Uniting :for Peace Resolution) to maintain
international peace and security. Article 51 also 1nakes express provision for "the inherent right o:f individual" self-defense. In both
instances the state or states engaged in individual or collective selfdefense are required to report action taken by them to the Security
Council. The Security Council, pursuant to ...'-\.rticle 51, and the Gen€ral Assembly, pursuant to the Uniting for Peace Resolution's interpretation o:f the Charter, continue to have authority to take such
action as is deemed reasonably necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security.
Article ·51Inakes no legal delineation between collective or individual self-defense other than in terms o:f the number o:f participants.
However, the distinction bet,veen maintenance o:f international peace
and security on the one hand, and self-defense on the other is 1narked.
Self-defense 1nay be either individual or collective. The presu1nption
is that the maintenance o:f international peace and security would be
by collective processes, although this is still open to some doubt, and
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it may be possible to find situations in 'vhich the maintenance of international peace and security could be accomplished, initially, by
individual means.
In a recent analysis of the theory of collective self-defense, McDevitt has come to the conclusion that a choice between collective and
individual self-defense is not a legal one. It was his view that practical conditions such as the nature of the provocative act, the type of
danger likely to befall the receiving state, the capacity of the Security Council to take adequate control of the situation, the manner in
which the offending state created the dangerous condition, and
whether the defensive action taken was i1nperative under all of the
attendant circumstances had to be taken into account in arriving at
a decision. 40 In the space age, "'. here time itself has taken on a new
dimension and "~here the existence of fearful '-veapons of mass destruction 'vould constitute a threat of a new order of magnitude~ the
political and military considerations ''ould seem to argue for individual self-defense, if the threat 'vere to emanate from a space-borne
weapon of mass destruction.
Although the term self-defense emphasizes individual as opposed
to collective or universal defense, it should not be overlooked that the
successful defense of one state serves as a substantial benefit to the
whole community. Still, individual self-defense as a legal doctrine
is subject to national abuse. In the 1962 Cuban situation, the government of Cuba asserted that it was permitted to position offensive
weapons on its shores because of its need to defend itself against
aggression from the United States. 41 Germany attacked Poland in
1939 because of the claimed necessity for German "self-defense"
against "aggressive" Polish intent. The doctrine has, throughout
40

::McDevitt, supra note 38, at 75-82. Compare Brownlie, supra note 13, at
219, and Bowet~, supra note 13.
41 Third parties are prone to employ the term "aggression" in passing political
judgment on interstate relationships. Thus the Soviet government during the
1962 Cuban crisis stated that the President of the United States in upholding
the collective quarantine action had tried "to justify these unprecedented
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Times, October 24, 1962. Compare, Tunkin, "Introduction," 1960 Soviet YearBook of International Law 22 (1961).
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history, been convenient to those states which have sought to violate
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states or to engage
in power politics in the international arena.
For this reason the use of collective measures is generally to be preferred to individual coercive activities. In the international community, no less than w·ithin the municipal processes of states, the rule
of la 'v generally requires that the first reference of disputes be to
community legal processes. The maintenance and extension of man's
·c entral values require conformity to this goal. The Charter of the
lJnited Nations, as a legal docu1nent, as 'veil as the conscience of mankind, reflects the "Judgment of the 'vorld comtnunity that collective
action is to be preferred to the unrestricted use of force by individual
nations * * *." 42 It has often been urged that States living under the
regime of that Charter can no longer find justification for the use
·of force in their 1nere unilateral declaration." 43 For these reasons
it has often been suggested that "the willingness of states to undertake the enforcement of international peace and security is the mark
of conscience and a developed standard of values." 44 The same holds
true for the collective enforcement of the legal condition of selfdefense.45
A_ sound policy decision bet,veen the use of collective as opposed
to individual processes for the n1aintenance of legal rights in outer
space must depend on the nature of the threat to cotnmunity and in·diviclual expectations for international peace and security. l\fany
voices have pointed to the dangers which may be directed to,vard
·states fro1n outer space. 46
The nature of the dangers, and the need for immediate response
to threatened harm fron1 outer space, must necessarily affect a nation's choice to employ individual or collective measures. It also suggests the need for inordinate caution in arriving at a decision to position \\"'eapons of mass destruction in outer space. In this connection,
Berlrner in 1958, noted that it may be necessary to use such a 'veapon
.as a military force "but that its employment is sufficiently dangerous
42 Cbayes, supra note 33, at 553-554.
43 Ibid.
44 Christo! and Davis, supra note 14, at 538.
45 It should be noted that a preference for collective processes may serve the
interests of those states possessing extensive and reliable security commitments.
46 Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age 220-1 (1958) ; 'Vhite, "Air and
Space are Indivisible," Air Force 40 (l\Iarch 1948) ; 'Vhite, "The Aerospace
.and :Military Operations," 12 Air University Quarterly Review (Winter-Spring
1960-1961) ; Lerner, The Age of Overkill (1!362) ; Lapp, Kill and Overkill
{1962).
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to the uses in its present total form to imply that it can be used only
'vith the greatest circumspection and for compelling motives." 41
President Eisenhower's Science Advisory Committee, in 1958, stated
a national policy when it observed "We wish to be. sure that space
is not used to endanger our security. If space is to be used for military purposes, we must be prepared to use space to defend ourselves." 48 l(illian, in 1932, reconfirmed this view 'vhen he stated that
for the sake of the free world the United States "must not slacken
in (its) determination to maintain military strength adequate to
deter an aggressor. This is still, in my view, the surest 'vay to deter
'var and to give a sense of confidence and stability to the Free
'Vorld." 49
In 1962 President l(ennedy stated that the United States could
not go "unprotected against the hostile misuse of space any more
than we go unprotected against the hostile use of land or sea." 50 In
the same month, Secretary of State Rusk told the Senate that "no
great nation can ever abandon its elementary right of unilateral
action if that becomes necessary for its own security." 51 Although
the response in October 1962, to the threat posed by the Soviet Union
in Cuba 'vas a collective one, President Kennedy in answer to a
hypothetical question relating to that situation remarked that "the
United States has the means * * * as a sovereign power to defend
itself. And, of course, exercises that power; has in the past; and
would in the future. But we, of course, keep to ourselves and hold
to ourselves, under the United States Constitution, and under the
laws of international la,v, the right to defend our security. On our
o'vn, if necessary-though we, as I say, hope to always move in
concert with our allies, but on our own, if that situation was necessary to protect our survival or integrity of other vital interests." 52
It seems reasonably clear that the right of a state to its continued
existence, as reflected in its fundamental concern for its o'vn security,
is the central issue in international law and relations. International
law authorizes states to protect their security rights by reference to
47 Berkner, "Earth Satellites and Foreign Policy," 36 Foreign Affairs 225
(1958).
4 8 Introduction to Outer Space, The President's Science Advisory Committee
I (1958).
49 Killian, "Shaping a Public Policy for the Space Age," in Bloomfield, ed.,
Outer Space Prospects tor Man and Society 187 (1962).
5 0 New York Times, September 13, 1962.
51 Rusk, "Situation in Cuba," Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and
Armed Services, 8'ith Congress, ~nd Session 33 (1962).
5 2 New York Times, November 21, 1962.
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the legal doctrines of n1aintenance of international peace and security
and of self-defense. Each doctrine may be implemented by collective
measures. Self-defense may be implemented by individual measures,
and perhaps international peace and security may be protected
through the same procedures.
At the present stage of the development of world institutions, it
remains the duty of each state to deter1nine for itself (although it
may make this determination in a comn1unity forum) what conditions must exist for it to be secure. A state is therefore able to determine for itself 'vhat it regards as an jmproper invasion or unpermitted reduction of that essential condition of security. A state is
also authorized, at least initially and in theory, to determine for
itself the procedures whereby corrective action may be undertaken,
and in this connection it may determine that it ·will be bound by collective procedures. On the other hand, each state has reserved from
the application of collective procedures its inherent right of individual self-defense, and depending on the nature of the threat to a
state's security, it may be obliged to determine for itself how it will
go about reestablishing that requisite degree of security. It may be
obliged to have recourse to immediate and unilateral self-help.
The means for maintaining or obtaining the requisite degree of
security are theoretically, and perhaps, practically, unlimited. International la 'v has sought to regulate the use of force, and additionally, as has been pointed out, has sought to assure to collective
processes the maximum management of the use of force. However,
'vhen funda1nental national interests are at stake, the seeming illogic
of the employment of substantial force-general war-may not be
persuasive. The alternative of limited war may also prove illusory.
Nonetheless, at some point the demands of national security may
require the use of force or coercion, and reason requires that it be
proportionate to the anticipated benefits. Security, like law or history, is a seamless ·web. Therefore, challenges to it, in and fro1n any
dimension, including outer space, require the most searchingly intelligent responses which man is able to bring to bear on any question.
The range of man's interests in security requires attention not only
to his need for protection. These interests must also take into account
an affirmative a"~areness that the unilateral aYoidance of destructive
conduct, including violence, in the dim~nsion of outer space may contribute to world security. For national abstention from violence or
the threat of violence in or from space may result in reciprocal conduct on the part of other states. Unilateral avoidance of destructive
violence and joint expectations respecting limitations on the use of
force are capable of producing a condition of minimum public order
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in outer space. The existence of such a condition can contribute
materially to restraint in the use of outer space. The a voidance of
reckless threats and provocative conduct may direct attention to the
fact that national security is not exclusively the product of force.
In arriving at a means to promote the security of a state-either
by collective or unilateral means-it is necessary to take into account
values supportive of the national interest in addition to the central
one of security. Such additional values include, but are not limited
to those of proper respect for legal processes and institutions, protection of national interests through nonviolent means, the health and
'velfare of its citizens, the protection of cultural and spiritual progress, the maintenance of a viable economy, a wide distribution of
dignity and respect, and a protection of learned traditions within an
environment capable of producing rational change.
The means to promote such goals in addition to coercion include,
among others, a continual enlargement of individual skills and
knowledge, an enhanced resource reservoir capable of producing
greater wealth and fuller employment, a dynamic and progressive
seience and technology, a more effective utilization of social and
political capabilities, an extended national reputation resulting from
a growth in prestige and respect, and, finally, more positive uses of
the capabilities of international organizations, and in particular the
United Nations.
Through the latter, for example, it may be possible for a state to
demonstrate its 'villingness to make use of peaceful processes to resolve international disputes. In alluding to this use of the United
Nations, Secretary Rusk stated in 1962, that one of the greatest
strengths possessed by the United States in the post-Cuba crisis 'vas
that "'ve carry our purposes on our sleeve, and the purposes 've carry
are for peace 'vi thin the framework of the United Nations kind of
'vorld community * * *." 53
It has long been the policy of the United States to rely on the
United Nations as a _means for arriving at an acceptable regime for
outer space. In 1960 Assistant Secretary of State "'\Vilcox stated that
"only the United Nations is able to cope 'vith the complicated, political, legal, and technical problems involved in assuring the open and
orderly conduct of space activities." 54 As has already been suggested,
a further modest beginning in this direction would be the initiation
53
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of verified inspection and control procedures for satellite launches. 55
There is general consensus that the United Nations will serve
effectiYely as a means to minimize inter~ational tension, and even
conflict, resulting from national activities in outer space. However,
the chance of good success, particularly where the larger issues of
security are involved, has been described as "highly improbable because the Great Powers would expect to forego prestige advantages,
possible military advantages, and at least some degree of military
privacy, if they internationalized the development of outer space." 5 s
Short of internationalizing the developn1ent of outer space, it is
clear that important benefits have already resulted from cooperation
between the two resource nations. But as J(norr has indicated, such
cooperative benefits accrue 'vhen four conditions exist, namely, where
there is a consensus that the space activity is primarily concerned
with peaceful, i.e., nonaggressive and beneficial, purposes; " . here the
activity is very expensive; where the activity is routine and lacking
in prestige considerations; and where operational requirements, such
as weather forecasting or television communications, require such
cooperation. 57
,.Vithin the context of selecting either collective or individual
processes in order to cope with the prior positioning by a state of a
'veapon of mass destruction in outer space or on a celestial body, international la "\"Y offers little detailed guidance. It does, however,
provide suitable insight into the question of whether recourse must
be had to the principles of international peace and security or to selfdefense. In either eYent it may be "·ell to recall under such circutnstances la 'v has been described as a concession by force to reason. In
the area examined here it 'vould appear that reason "·ould be well
served by the avoidance on the part of states of tension creating situations. Recognition of this fact has undoubtedly contributed to the
existence of the ~Ioscow Treaty, 1963, and General Assembly Resolution 1884 (XVIII) of October 17, 1963. 58
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57 Knorr, op. cit., 151.
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C. PROCESSES TO INSURE THE REASONABLE USES OF
OUTER SPACE
With the growing recognition on the part of states that a principle
of law exists supporting the free and peaceful use of outer space,
there has also come a demand that space activities and uses be controlled in such a way that states may enjoy the fullest benefits of the
principle. At this time attention will be called to the extent to 'vhich
international la 'v provides processes for the regulation of space uses.
Such processes will be considered under the heading of noncoerci ve
(permissive) processes and coercive (also permissive) processes.
However, before surveying these processes, it is necessary to examine
analytically certain factors ·which are pertinent to the selection of
such processes.
1. Factors to Be Considered in Selection of Processes

The world community, including its separate but component parts,
must take into account both practical and legal considerations in
arriving at decisions relating to the reasonable uses of outer space.
It would be pertinent, for example, for a state to relate its response
to the conduct of another state, 'vhich through fast and covert action
had positioned in outer space or on a celestial body, on a relatively
permanent basis, a major offensive missile threat capable of nuclear
mass destruction. A wholly different response might be in order if
the satellite 'vere equipped with observational devices per1nitting it
to scan and report both cloud cover and happenings taking place
on or above the high seas or within a state. In the one case the use
would very probably constitute a deliberate and extraordinarily
significant modification of the existing world power structure-a
po,ver structure which at the present time rests upon an "uneasy
equilibrium depending upon a highly tentative balance of terror for
its success." 59 On the other hand, observation, without more, fails
to create a danger of overt harm. Rather, it provides a means of
ascertaining the intentions of other nations, and hence, may contribute measurably to a condition of world stability.
a. Precise Nature of Facts
The precise facts to be taken into account 'vith regard to ascertaining 'vhether outer space is in fact being used for reasonable purposes
are not different from the facts to be taken into account in the use
of the high seas. Similarity in patterns of conduct has resulted in a
similarity of legal status. Both, it has been suggested, follow the
59
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concept of a res communis mnnium-, that is, both are open to reasonable use subject to reasonable controls.
The follo,ving constitute the major, but not necessarily all of
the facts to be taken into account: as suggested abovQ, the nature of
harm, if any, to the maintenance of international peace, security, and
self-defense; the precise nature and location of a given weapon or
weapons; the comparative ''eapons capabilities and po,ver structures
of the contending nations (including their friends and allies) ; the
physical location of the threatening space vehicle; the reality of
the threat, if at all; the over-all nature of the political environinent;
the extent of implicit or express international agree1nent, including
the existence of agreement, if any, on prelaunch registration~ verification, and inspection of satellites; the extent to which resource and
other states possess reciprocal interests and are motivated by the desire to a chi eYe accom1nodations of conflicting interests; and the
a vail ability and effectiveness of alternate processes. These factors, as
"~en as others, are constantly in motion, so that a perception of these
considerations as well as their interpretation constitutes both an ongoing and graYe national responsibility. 'Vhen such factors as those
enumerated are balanced against such imponderables as the prospect
of achieving international (or regional) support for collective measures-or the supposedly some,vhat more predictable unilateral responses of a single state-it becomes readily apparent that factual
problems do play a very large role in determining 'vhether or not a
state may engage in a given use of outer space. 'Vithout unnecessarily pyramiding difficult factual considerations, it might also be
noted that space uses cannot be separated from international attitudes toward a condition of general and complete disarma1nent. By
reason of the fearsome capabilities of weapons of mass destruction
situated in space, the policy n1aker who n1ust determine the extent of
reasonable use of outer space has grave responsibilities. Activities
and processes in space, for better or "Torse, n1ay very largely condition n1an's expectations as to future activities in other areas.
2. Noncoercive Processes

This classification is intended to describe a n1eans of achieving a
reasonable use of space in 'vhich the role of n1ilitary force plays no
part. This distinction is 1nade in view of the fact that force, in its
larger sense, n1ay take many for1ns of 'vhich military force is but one
instance. Permissive measures to insure that outer space is used for
reasonable purposes include such pacific, collective, or unilateral~
actions as political, economic, or scientific procedures and public
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op1n1on. As means of achieving compliance with legal expectations
they may be regarded as sanctions, but, as stated above, they do not
involve the use of military force or coercion.
A means of expressing disapproval of state action and thereby
endeavoring to induce a modification of state conduct has been to
withdraw diplomatic recognition. This is an expression of disapproval employing political processes and involves legal consequences.
At times it has been regarded as a prelude to war, but it need not
be. Political disapproval may also find expression in a policy of
nonrecognition.
Economic disapproval may take many forms. The best known are
economic boycotts. This form of disapproval may be circumscribed
by treaties and other agreements. 60
Occasionally, scientific measures have been employed to induce a
state to modify its course of conduct. This has usually taken the
form of nondistribution of scientific data acquired by one state and
useful to another. This measure has been used rarely because of the
facility with which other states may retaliate, and because of the
com1non need for this kind of data.
Public opinion in a "\vorld of po,ver politics may occasionally seem
to be a slender reed upon "\vhich to place reliance in an effort to induce a state to conform to community expectations. Still, it is not
without its influence, and there are those who honor it. This was
seen by Gray who wrote that states take into account "the sanction
arising from the opinion of civilized nations that the rules [of international law] are right, and that civilized nations are morally bound
to obey them." 61
a. Legal Institutions and Activities
Legal institutions, such as the United Nations, the International
Court of Justice, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The
Hague, are equipped to assist in determining the standards of reasonable use of outer space. Suitable ad hoc bodies may be created to
serve this goal.
According to l(unz "Non-military-economic, financial, diplomatic-sanctions, reprisals not involving the threat or use of military force, remain legal
under the U.N. Charter. But the Bogota Charter of the Organization of Amer·
ican States also expressly forbids the use of coercive measures of an economic
or political character to force the sovereign will of another state and obtain
from it advantages of any kind." "Sanctions in International Law," supra
note 36, at 332.
61 Gray, The Nature and Source8 of Law 131 (2nd ed., 1927). Compare Root,
''The Sanction of International Law," 2 A.J.I.L. 451 (1908).
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The United Nations, through the Resolutions of the General Asse.mbly, and particularly through the deliberations of the Con1mittee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, has already made great contributions to the development of a structured legal regime for outer
space. 62 It 'vill continue to do so, particularly through the process
of drafting a series of technical conventions dealing 'vith such matters as liability and jurisdiction and return of space vehicles and
personnel. 63 There is much support favoring the establishment of
an office within the United Nations-either through the expansion of
the Outer Space Affairs Section of the Secretary-General's Officeor, perhaps, by way of a new specialized agency, 'vhereby greater
international control might be exercised over activities in outer space.
A primary function of such an office or agency would be to manage
traffic control and also to engage in verified inspections and registrations of space launches.
The International Court of Justice may be used to determine the
meaning of international legal concepts contained in customary and
express international law. This may be accomplished either through
litigous cases or by way of advisory opinions. Litigation between
states as to the meaning of reasonable use of outer space 1vould provide a most desirable process for the clarification of principles and
rules of the emerging law of outer space. This would permit full
use of the principles set forth in Article 38 of the Statute of the
Court. A similar conclusion is attained if the problem were presented
in the form of a request for an advisory opinion.
It should be noted, however, that in the past the Soviet Union has
successfully a voided the status of a defendant before the Court. It
is almost completely improbable that the United States would be able
to maintain a litigous action against the Soviet Union before the
Court in view of the latter's probable use of the contention that
a space problem affected the Soviet Union's domestic jurisdiction.
Although Article 36 ( 6) of the Statute of the Court makes provision
that the Court shall be entitled to resolve issues of jurisdiction, the
United States in accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court
made a reservation permitting it to determine for itself what constitutes a matter of domestic jurisdiction. The reservation operates
on a reciprocal basis. Therefore, it would be possible for the Soviet
Union to claim the use of the United States reservation in order to
62
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forestall adjudication of space problems. This reservation has been
popularly known in the United States as the Connally Amendment. 64
In view of anticipated difficulties in clarifying the substance of
space law through litigous processes, there remains the possibility
that valuable judicial talent may be utilized through the process of
advisory opinions.
The United Nations has provided the most effective forum yet conceived for the discussion and enlargement of space law principles.
It may be assumed that in the future the Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space will continue to reflect the ongoing forces of
customary international law, and will prepare drafts of principles
and more detailed technical rules which will be presented to member
states as resolutions, declarations, treaties, and conventions. Continned discussions and debates will provide great insight into both
the direction which the law is taking and also the speed with which
it is being assimilated into national conduct.
3. Coercive Processes

The spectrum of coercion ranges all the way from the slightest
plus over zero to unlimited and unrestricted force encompassed in the
concept of general war. It is generally agreed that the amount of
coercion e1nployed should be proportionate to the dangers actually
faced or within the range of reasonable contemplation. Reasonableness depends upon the practical circumstances of a given time and
place and may be measured generally in terms of the amount of
international tension. The latter, of course, is the product of physical
capabilities and national intent, and both can be measured in terms
of express and implied conduct.
Such processes may be either national or international, e.g., individual or collective. They may be based on two principal and alternative legal theories, namely, the right to maintain international
peace and security, and/or the inherent right of self-defense. As has
been indicated above, the collective process is preferable and possesses
great 1noral and practical value when the danger of harm is somewhat remote and the need for a response is not immediate, or at
least, may be delayed. The unilateral response may be employed
64

Hearings on S. Res. 196 Before a Subcomrnittee of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, 79th Cong., 2d. Sess. 1 (1946) ; 92 Gong. Rec. 10624,

10694-97: Ohristol, "The United States and Prospects for a 'Vorld Rule of
Law," 7 South Dakota Law Review 24 (1962) ; Preuss, "The International
Court of Justice, the Senate, and l\latters of Domestic Jurisdiction," 40 A.J.l.L.
736 (1946). Compare Case of Certain Norwegian Loans: I.C.J. Reports, 1951, 9.
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lvhen there is an immediate and proximate threat of substantial
harm.
Based on the require1nents of proportionality and taking into account the conclusions previously arrived at that peaceful, i.e., nonaggressive and beneficial, uses of outer space are reasonable and
therefore legal, 65 it is suggested that the following protective uses
may be employed. Let us assume that the fact situation is one in
'vhich one state has placed an uninspected and unregistered satellite
into earth orbit or where the nature and capabilities of the satellite
are unknown to the subjacent state. It is suggested that the subjacent
state might proceed in the following sequence to protect its legal
rights.
First, it 1night engage in surveillance of the orbiting satellite from
positions either on the surface, in the airspace, and in outer space.
In the course of such surveillance it might approach the satellite in
order to make visual or photographic or other 1nechanical for1ns of
inspection. At this point harmful physical contact would be a voided.
This could be based on the existence of a reasonable safety zone.
Second, if the surveillance "~ere to disclose facts indicating that the
presence or purpose of the satellite involved a restricted amount of
danger to the inspecting state, then the latter might cause the offending space vehicle to modify its course. This assumes that modification
of direction were in fact possible, that the modification of course
would reduce or minimize the contemplated danger, and that the
inspected satellite would agree to such procedures. Third, if due
cause were shown to the inspecting nation and if the inspected satellite had failed to modify its course upon request, then, if the condition 'vere sufficiently grave, the inspected satellite might be taken
into possession or intercepted by the complaining state.
At this point several options would be open to the respective states.
If the vehicle 'vere proven to be in reasonable use, it might be released to continue in orbit, or if this were not physically possible, it
would be safeguarded by the inspecting state until it could be returned safely to the launching state. If, on the other hand, the space
vehicle 'vere in fact engaged in conduct unreasonably dangerous to
the existence of the inspecting state, it might be rendered inoperative
through destruction or other processes. In any event, personnel on
board would be protected and repatriated to the national state. 66
65

Supra, pp. 263-319.

Goedhuis, after analyzing this problem, bas concluded that "It is difficult
to deny to a state the right to destroy a satellite which it believes presents a
threat to the security of the state." He consulted the views of such writers as
66
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The foregoing procedures, it is submitted, are preferred processes
when there is an intention that general war should not result. This
condition, short of general war, might result from the use of such
processes if at the time of launch it is understood that a state has
a reasonable right to assure itself that the presence of an orbiting
satellite is not designed to cause it great and irremedial harm. However, any process of inspection, no matter how reasonable and proportionate to the security needs of a state, may in fact, though
needlessly, be made the basis for a general war. An early express
agreement among resource states on detailed security procedures in
space would greatly ameliorate this condition.
Much of the problem would be resolved by general acceptance of
the view that the presence of an observational type satellite conforms
to the standards of reasonableness. However, until it becomes possible to conduct positive identification of vehicles and objects in
orbit or until suitable verification, inspection, and registration procedures have been established, the problem will continue to vex states. 67
There is a growing consensus among writers that it is reasonable
for states to use all available scientific and technological processes
to ascertain the purposes and capabilities of transiting satellites.
This is supported by the realization that space vehicles and devices
may be equipped to achieve a great variety of uses. Thus, Crane has
suggested postlaunch practices, which may be necessary in the interKittrie, Quarles (Deputy Secretary of Defense), and Becker (Legal Adviser
to the Department of State) in arriving at the foregoing conclusion. Goedhuis
noted that Kittrie held that if a reconnaissance satellite threatens national
security it might be destroyed or caused to malfunction and that Becker was
of the view that something short of armed attack would justify national security measures. Quarles, on the other hand, urged that the mere presence over
the United States of a Soviet reconnaissance satellite need not be considered
to be objectionable. Goedhuis, "Some Trends in the Political and Legal Thinking on the Conquest of Space." 9 Nether lands International Law Review 130131 (1962). It has been urged, since at the present international law does not
prohibit reconnaissance from outer space, that the intentional destruction of a
peaceful reconnaissance satellite "would appear to be proscribed by the Charter
as a 'use * * * of force * * * inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations.'" The same author has concluded that "It would appear * * • that
the doctrine of self-defense is too narrow to support such action." "Legal
Aspect of Reconnaissance in Airspace and Outer Space." 61 Oolun~bia Law Review 1082-1083 (1961).
67
It has been stated in connection with scientific and military observation
satellites that "it is not only difficult to tell these kinds of observation satellites apart, it is impossible to do so." Katz, "The Technological Environment
and its Prospects," in Goldsen, ed., International Political I1nplications of
Activities in Outer Space 14 ( 1960).
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ests of national security, namely, acquisition, tracking, identification,
neutralization, capture, and destruction. 68 ICittrie has urged that
if an observational satellite threatens national security it may be
destroyed or caused to malfunction. 69
The Davies Draft Code of Rules on the Exploration and Uses of
Outer Space, in taking into account the security needs of states, has
made provision for the diversion or destruction of space vehicles under certain circumstances. The draft accepts the view that no spacecraft may at any stage of its flight enter the airspace of another state
without the consent of the latter, except in the course of making an
emergency landing. In the event of any other entry, the subjacent
state may "divert or destroy any spacecraft which enters its airspace
without * * *" the prescribed national consent. 70
The term "interception" has also been used. Thus, Cooper has
asked, "is it permissible for a State to intercept in outer space a
:foreign spacecraft known to be armed with a nuclear warhead and
thereby constituting a source of potential attack on any State flown
over~" 71 General Gavin urged as easly as 1958, the development of a
"satellite interceptor." 72 Antisatellite operations could involve the
"destruction or neutralization of a space object and this is far easier
if one shoots from the orbital plane of the space object, approximately under the satellite, even in the case of a maneuverable satellite." 73
It may be expected that common practices now current on the high
seas and in the airspace would be available in the identification of
space vehicles. Under the law of the sea, the vessel of one state may
approach the vessel of another state in order to ascertain its identity/4 although "warships on the high seas have complete immunity
:from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State." 75 Under certain circumstances a naval vessel may challenge, board, search,
Crane, "Law and Strategy in Space," 6 Orbis 283 (1962) ; compare Crane,
"Soviet Attitude Toward International Law," 56 A.J.I.L. 704-706 (1962).
69 Kittrie, " 'Aggressive' Uses of Space Vehicles-the Remedies in International Law," Fourth Colloquium 198-219 (1963).
10 Draft Code of Rules on the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space 14
(n.d.).
11 Cooper, supra note 17, at 53.
12 Gavin, supra note 46, at 224.
73 Cagle, "The Navy's Future Role in Space," 89 United States Naval Institute Proceedings 91 (January 1963).
74 The .iJfarianna Flora, 11 Wheaton 1, 3 (1826) ; Brittin and Watson, International Law tor Seagoing Officers, 2nd ed., 101 (1960).
75 Article 8(1), Convention on the High Seas, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/L.53
and Corr. 1.
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and inspect the papers of a nonnational vessel. 76 Capture may result
·when there has been a serious violation of international law by a
vessel on the high seas. 77
Approach to vessels may be accomplished by other naval vessels or
by aircraft, and in the latter instance n1ay be quite close. In 1960
the Soviet Union protested the "buzzing" of its vessel the "Vega" by
United States public aircraft on and over the high seas. The "Vega"
although ostensibly a fishing tra,vler, vvas equipped with extensive
electronic equipment and had pursued a lengthy intelligence mission
along the eastern coast of the United States. In rejecting the Soviet
protest concerning the close approach to the "Vega" by United States
aircraft, which protest was described as being "without foundation,"
the United States noted that "in such circumstances there is every
reason for establishing the identity of such a vessel and the nature
of its activity." 78 In recent years Soviet aircraft have also flown at
low altitudes over United States naval vessels on the high seas.
In conclusion, it should be noted that the foregoing recitation of
coercive processes available to states, either collectively or individually, are alternative rather than exclusive processes. States desiring
to keep the peace and to achieve a minimum amount of world order
may readily achieve this goal in outer space by exercising selfrestraint in positioning weapons of mass destruction in that environment.79 Further, they may have recourse to all of the noncoercive
processes "\vhich have been suggested. Failing that they may employ,
where the challenge to national security is extreme, the proportionate
coercive processes which have been described. However, in the
formulation of national space policy, every nation should take into
account the possibility that its decision to make unreasonable uses
of outer space may deny to all the fullest realization of the resources
and potentials of outer space. It can be predicted that space resource
states 'viii not regard international law as irrelevant in arriving at
policies seeking to maximize the peaceful and beneficial uses of outer
space. A "\vide range of sanctions, depending on the nature of transgression, are recognized by international la "\V. The key to their use
is the doctrine of reasonableness as influenced by the quality of the
danger.
76 Articles 22 and 23, Convention on the High Seas, ibid.
77 Schwarzenberger, A lJianual of Internationa-l Law 126 (4th ed. 1960) ; l\IcDougal and Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans 885-893, 806-823 (1962).
7 8 ''United States Note of July 21, 1960," 43 Dcpartn~ent ot State Bulletin
213 (1960) ; compare, Brownlie, supra note 13, at 247-254.
79 By reason of General Assen1bly Resolution 1884 (XVIII), 1963, there appears to be specific international recognition of the duty to avoid such space
conduct. Annex 13, intra, pp. 462-463.

